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Abstract—Passive Optical Networks (PONs) are regarded as
the preferred technology for broadband access networks. PONs
provide high capacity and low-power consumption at a low-cost
deployment. Besides, the dependability of PONs is becoming more
important as end-users also expect access networks to be highly
reliable. Operators, on the other hand, are more concerned about
reducing the number of clients affected by failures (i.e. failure
impact) while keeping the costs at reasonable values. This paper
identifies the best suited protection schemes for PONs, and gives
a deep insight into how the access network layout and design
decisions affect the performance of these schemes. To achieve
this goal, the PON deployment area is described by means of a
network geometric model. Then, different protection mechanisms
are deployed following this model and evaluated in terms of
failure impact, availability and cost. In this manner, the perfor-
mance of the protection schemes is assessed, taking into account
the effects of the network layout on these three parameters.
Moreover, the trade-offs between failure impact, availability and
cost caused by design decisions are also pinpointed.
Index terms: Availability, Capital Expenditures, failure impact, net-
work geometric model, Passive Optical Networks, protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the significance of broadband fibre-based access
networks is arising in order to meet the increasing bandwidth
demands required by new services. Among several Fiber to
the X (FTTX, with X meaning either node, curb/cabinet,
building or home) solutions, Passive Optical Networks (PONs)
are regarded as the best suited technology to implement fiber
access networks [1]. PONs are flexible, scalable and not only
provide high bandwidth to end-users, but also present a low-
cost deployment and low energy consumption. Due to these
features, both PONs and next-generation PONs are envisioned
as the most promising solution for future broadband fiber-
based access networks [2].
Yet, as new services emerge, such as telesurgery or in-
teractive gaming, end-users are not only concerned about
higher bandwidths. Both business and residential users also
demand reliable service delivery and business continuity. Thus,
the increase in dependability requirements calls for providing
protection in the access network. In fact, the dependability of
PONs has been a case of concern over the last years, and
several protection mechanisms and dependability analyses can
be found in literature [3], [4]. However, most of these studies
do not include the network layout where PONs are deployed.
When designing PON-based access networks, several PONs
share trenches and distribution points to reduce the CAPEX.
This infrastructure sharing may lead to simultaneous failures
due to common causes, affecting the dependability. Thus, de-
sign decisions and network layout must be taken into account
when deploying protection in PONs.
Availability, meaning readiness for correct service [5], is
an attribute commonly used to assess the dependability of a
system. In Service Level Agreements (SLAs), users typically
demand a guaranteed level of service availability. Operators,
however, are much more interested in reducing the number
of clients affected by failures (i.e. failure impact). As large
outages typically involve great loss to operators, both econom-
ically and in reputation, the significance of the failure impact
has increased recently [6].
This paper aims at giving a deep insight into the best suited
protection mechanisms for PONs. Based on [7], where an
unprotected PON was analyzed, this work also provides a
comprehensive understanding of how the physical layout, in-
frastructure sharing and design decisions affect the protection
schemes. Besides the CAPEX, which plays a major role when
deploying a PON [8], two dependability-related parameters
are analyzed. Namely, failure impact, capturing the operator’s
perspective, and asymptotic availability, closer to the user’s
point of view. These analyses lead to the identification of the
most efficient protection schemes, and pinpoint the effects that
the network layout causes on them. Also, they reveal important
trade-offs between failure impact, availability and CAPEX.
This paper is organized as follows. Sect. II explains the
general PON architecture and the geometric model assumed
as the PON physical layout. Sect. III introduces the considered
protection mechanisms and their deployment options. Sect.
IV presents the failure impact of the different mechanisms,
based on the network geometric model. Sect. V introduces
the availability analysis of the protection schemes deployed
following the geometric model. Sect. VI compares the CAPEX
of the schemes under the assumptions of the geometric model.
Finally Sect. VII gives the conclusions of this work.
II. PON ARCHITECTURE AND NETWORK GEOMETRIC
MODEL
This section presents the typical PON architecture and the
network geometric model describing the area under study.
A. PON Architecture
The typical architecture of a PON is shown in Fig. 1. At
the operator’s Central Office (CO), the Optical Line Terminal
(OLT) is deployed, where OLT ports are accommodated in
the OLT chassis. The equipment at the user’s side is referred
to as Optical Network Unit (ONU). The intermediate point
between the CO and the user premises is called Remote Node
(RN). Each RN is equipped with a RN chassis housing a set
of passive elements. These passive elements can be splitters
for Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) PON, Arrayed Waveg-
uide Gratings (AWGs) for Wavelength Division Multiplexing
(WDM) PON, or both for Hybrid WDM/TDM PON. Finally,
the fiber that interconnects the OLT and the RN is denoted as
Feeder Fiber (FF), while the term Distribution Fiber (DF) is
used for the fiber between the RN and the ONU.
 
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of PONs architecture.
B. Network Geometric Model
To describe the PON deployment area, a network geometric
model called simplified street length model, or Manhattan
model, is employed. In general, geometric models are based
on the assumption of a uniform distribution of subscribers
over the considered area. Although this may lead to a lack
of accuracy [9], it makes these models generally applica-
ble to many different areas. By tailoring their parameters
appropriately, general reasonable results for a first analysis
can be obtained. Among geometric models, the Manhattan
model is especially convenient for the purpose of this paper.
Besides its generality, this model captures the underlying
physical topology of PONs in urban and suburban areas quite
accurately. Regarding CAPEX, this property allows for an easy
calculation of the infrastructural needs of PONs. Hence, this
model has been widely employed for estimating the cost of
PONs in previous studies [8], [10]. On the dependability side,
this property facilitates the analysis of dependent failures, as
it is possible to seize the effect of incidents in the physical
topology causing more than one element to fail simultaneously.
In the Manhattan model, subscribers are uniformly dis-
tributed over a regular grid, as shown in Fig. 2. Each RN
serves a set of subscribers that are assembled forming a square
(the distribution level) on this grid, as can be seen in Fig. 2 b).
Similarly, the set of RNs served by the CO form a square array
(the feeder level), as in Fig. 2 a). The RNs and the CO are
located at the center of the corresponding levels. Both feeder
and distribution trenches (containing fibers) are depicted with
red lines and can only be laid horizontally or vertically.
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Fig. 2. Geometric model for subscriber and RN distribution.
Regarding the distribution level, one side of each distri-
bution level square contains n subscribers, where the distance
between subscribers is represented by l. Thus, each RN serves
n2 subscribers. At the feeder level,N distribution level squares
are contained on one side, and the distance between RNs is
denoted as L. Then, the CO serves N2 distribution levels
(RNs), and a total of N2  n2 subscribers (ONUs).
Dealing with the calculations at the distribution level, a
distribution level square encompasses n horizontal trenches
and 1 vertical trench. Each trench is composed by n  1 steps
of length l. Thus, the trenching length in one distribution level
square is equal to (n2   1)  l, while the total distribution
trenching length is N2  (n2   1)  l. The number of passive
elements at each RN chassis depends on its splitting ratio,
as well as on the number of subscribers served by a RN. It
follows the expression d n2splitting ratioe, while the total number
of passive elements can be calculated as N2d n2splitting ratioe.
At the feeder level, the trenching length follows the same
reasoning as before. Thus, the total trenching length at the
feeder level is equal to (N2 1)L. Concerning the equipment
at the CO, each passive element has to be connected to an OLT
port. Hence the number of OLT ports is equal to the total num-
ber of passive elements. Finally, the number of OLT chassis
is determined by the number of OLT ports and the number of
OLT ports per OLT chassis as d N
2d n2splitting ratio e
OLT ports per chassise.
1) Number of clients served by a trench: This parameter is
employed in following sections as part of the failure impact
analysis, and can be calculated as follows.
As for a distribution level square, the RN serves n2 clients.
The central step of the vertical distribution trench serves n2=2
clients going up and n2=2 clients going down, while n   2
steps remain to be examined. Then, there are (n  2)=2 steps
moving up from the RN and (n   2)=2 steps moving down
from the RN. Up from the RN, the number of clients served
by the vertical distribution trench diminishes by n every time
it crosses a horizontal distribution trench (horizontal trenches
serve n clients). This continues until the uppermost step of the
vertical distribution trench, serving only n clients. The same
occurs when moving down from the RN, the number of clients
served by a step of a vertical distribution trench is
n2
2
  i  n; i = 0; 1; :::; n  2
2
; (1)
knowing that for i = 0 there is only one step of length l
serving n2=2 clients (the central one), while for i 6= 0 there
are two steps of length l serving n2=2  i  n clients.
The same reasoning can be applied for the horizontal
distribution trench steps, following
n
2
  i; i = 0; 1; :::; n  2
2
; (2)
knowing that for i = 0 there is only one step of length l
serving n=2 clients (the central one), while for i 6= 0 there are
two steps of length l serving n=2  i clients.
The same line of thinking is valid for the feeder level. At
this level, the number of RNs served by a step of a vertical or
horizontal trench follows (3) and (4) respectively. Multiplying
(3) and (4) by n2 gives the number of clients served by a
vertical or horizontal feeder trench step respectively.
N2
2
  j N; j = 0; 1; :::; N   2
2
; (3)
N
2
  j; j = 0; 1; :::; N   2
2
: (4)
2) Distance between clients and CO: This subsection deals
with the distance between clients and CO, as it heavily affects
the availability that can be offered to a subscriber. Besides, the
length of fiber needed to be deployed (as part of the CAPEX)
is also derived from the client-CO distance.
Let’s focus first on the distribution level. Due to symmetry,
each distribution level square can be divided in four equivalent
quadrants. In each quadrant, there are n=2 diagonal clients at a
distance (n=2)l from the RN. Also, there are (n=2) 1 clients
at a distance ((n=2)  1)  l from the RN and other (n=2)  1
clients at a distance ((n=2) + 1)  l. This reasoning continues
till the furthest and closest clients, located at a distance (n 
1)  l and l from the RN respectively. Considering the four
quadrants, (5) expresses the number of clients that are at a
given distance from the RN, for one distribution level square.
4(n
2
 i) clients at a distance (n
2
i) l from the RN;
i = 0; 1; :::;
n
2
  1: (5)
Also, the fiber length in one distribution level is given by the
sum of all the previous distances, as each client is connected
to the RN by one fiber.
At the feeder level, the same logic applies and leads to the
number of RNs at a given distance from the CO, given in (6).
4(N
2
 j) RNs at a distance (N
2
j)L from the CO;
j = 0; 1; :::;
N
2
  1: (6)
At this level, each passive element hosted in a RN is connected
to the CO by one fiber. Thus, each RN is connected to the CO
by dn2=splitting ratioe fibers, and this must be considered
when calculating the fiber length at the feeder level from (6).
Finally, combining (5) and (6), the number of clients that
are at a given distance of the CO can be expressed as:
4  (N
2
  j)  4  (n
2
  i) clients at a distance
(
N
2
 j)  L+ (n
2
 i)  l from the CO;
j = 0; 1; :::;
N
2
  1; i = 0; 1; :::; n
2
  1: (7)
3) Baseline Scenario: In order to reproduce a currently
deployed PON as accurately as possible, the following values
have been chosen for the parameters.
Typically, the number of clients covered by a CO is around
10 000 [11]. Because of that, the values of n and N will vary
but keeping the total number of clients (n2 N2) close to 10
000. Splitters are assumed as passive elements (TDM PON)
with a splitting ratio of 32. Regarding the equipment at the
CO, the number of OLT ports per OLT chassis is fixed to
72 [12]. Concerning the linear distance between homes, l, a
value of 1/24 km is chosen as baseline, as it is a typical value
in suburban areas of the United States [8]. Finally, the linear
distance between RNs, L, is set to n  l.
III. PON PROTECTION MECHANISMS
This section introduces the analyzed protection mechanisms,
as well as the chosen deployment options for each mechanism.
A. Protection Mechanisms
In this study, five PON protection schemes have been ana-
lyzed. The schematic diagrams of the five protection variants
are shown in Fig. 3. Schemes a), b), c) and d) are taken from
literature, while scheme e) is a new proposed mechanism.
Schemes a) and b) in Fig. 3 (taken from [4] and [13]
respectively) cover protection of the feeder fibers only. Scheme
a) employs a protection feeder fiber in parallel with the
working feeder fiber. These fibers must be deployed in disjoint
trenches. On the other hand, scheme b) tries to reduce the
CAPEX by reusing the feeder fiber of different PONs for pro-
tection. This requires the use of additional coarse wavelength
division multiplexing (CWDM) couplers at the CO and the
RN, and interconnection fibers (and trenches) between RNs.
Besides, PONs protecting each other must employ different
wavelengths.
Variants c), d) and e) in Fig. 3 protect both feeder and
distribution fibers. In c), described in [4], all the elements
between the CO and the customer are duplicated. A coupler is
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Fig. 3. Schematic diagrams of the protection mechanisms.
needed at the client’s side, while protection and working fibers
must be deployed in disjoint trenches. However, it presents
a lack of flexibility as it is not possible to switch between
protection and working paths at the RN. Scheme d), introduced
in [3] is based in the same concept as b). ONUs in the same
PON protect each other in pairs, reusing the distribution fibers
for protection. In addition to the interconnection fibers and
trenches between ONUs, a coupler and an Optical Switch (OS)
is needed at the user’s side. Besides, this scheme does not
present the same lack of flexibility as scheme c).
Finally, scheme e) is a newly proposed variant. It duplicates
the feeder and distribution fibers, but not the passive element
at the RN. Again, working and protection fibers must be
deployed in disjoint trenches. Optical switches are needed both
at the CO and at the user’s side. If a failure occurs at the
working distribution fiber, the OS at the ONU switches to the
protection distribution fiber. If a fiber break takes place in the
feeder part, then the OS at the CO switches. This way, this
scheme presents the same flexibility as scheme d).
B. Deployment of Protection Mechanisms
The different ways of deploying the protection mechanisms
in the network geometric model are shown in Fig. 4. Ap-
proaches i) and ii) refer to the distribution level, where the
blue blocks represent clients. Approaches iii) and iv) refer to
the feeder level, where the green blocks depict distribution
levels. Dashed black lines represent new trenches, while solid
black lines denote protection fibers. For the sake of clarity,
some protection fibers are omitted, but they follow the same
pattern as the ones shown in Fig. 4.
At the distribution level, approach i) is employed by protec-
tion schemes c) and e). Protection fibers run vertically till they
cross the middle of the distribution level. Then, the protection
fibers follow the first working trench (in red) up to the RN.
This approach requires n new trenches of length (n   1)  l.
Also, the length of the protection fiber for each client is equal
to the length of its working distribution fiber plus l. Approach
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Fig. 4. Deployment approaches for the protection schemes.
ii) is employed by protection scheme d), where ONUs are
protected in pairs. Protection fibers run vertically till the paired
ONU, and then the working fiber of the paired ONU is reused
up to the RN. This approach also requires n trenches of
length (n   1)  l, and the length of the protection fiber is
always (n=2)  l. The length of the protection path for one
client is equal to the length of the working path of the paired
ONU plus (n=2)  l. In Fig. 4, both i) and ii) show the path
that protection fibers from the RN follow along the vertical
distribution trench. This is just to indicate that the vertical
distribution trench is reused for protection of the feeder fibers.
At the feeder level, approach iii) is applied for protection
schemes a), c), d) and e). This approach uses the same concept
as approach i) but at the feeder level. Yet, as the vertical
distribution trench is reused for hosting the protection fibers
(explained before), only the sections between distribution
levels require new trenches. Thus, the protection trenching
length is equal to N  (N   1)  l. Also, the length of the
protection fiber for each passive element at the RN is equal to
the length of its working feeder fiber plus L. Finally, approach
iv) is employed by protection scheme b). It follows the same
idea as approach ii). The protection trenching length is equal
to N  (N   1)  l, while the length of the protection fibers is
always (N=2)  L. The length of the protection path for each
passive element is equal to the length of the working path of
the paired passive element plus (N=2)  L.
IV. FAILURE IMPACT ANALYSIS
This section presents the failure impact analysis, performed
by means of network failure modes, of the protection schemes
deployed as explained in Sect. III-B.
A. Network Failure Modes
A network failure mode, x is defined by the set of elements
which have lost their traffic carrying capability [14]. Failure
modes are suitable for the failure impact analysis as they are
able to capture simultaneous failure of network elements due
to common causes (e.g. diggings). The set of elements covers
ONUs, distribution and feeder trench steps (protection and
working), passive elements, RN and OLT chassis and OLT
ports. Splitters, OS and CWDM couplers are considered when
needed. Failure modes related to trench steps imply failure of
all the contained fibers. Modes related to a RN chassis imply
failure of all the elements in it; and modes related to OLT
chassis imply failure of all the hosted OLT ports.
The probability of a failure mode, P (x), corresponds to
the unavailability of the elements defining the mode multiplied
by the availability of all other elements, as in (8). The
availability of each element is taken from [12] and [3].
P (x) = (
Y
y2x
Uy)  (
Y
z=2x
(1  Uz)): (8)
Hence, the number of clients that have lost service in a given
failure mode gives the failure impact of that mode. Clients lose
service if, in a given failure mode, the failed elements make
it impossible to establish a connection between them and the
CO. Elements at the user’s side affect (in scheme d), splitters
affect and protect) one client. Clients affected or protected
by trench steps are easily calculated from (1), (2), (3), (4)
and explanations in Sect. III-B. RN chassis affect (or protect)
n2 clients, where these n2 clients are distributed among the
passive elements as evenly as possible. Thus, passive elements
may affect (or protect) a varying number of clients. OLT ports,
CO OS and CWDM couplers affect (or protect) the same
number of clients as the passive element they are connected to.
Finally, the clients affected by an OLT chassis depend on the
hosted OLT ports, and OLT ports are distributed among OLT
chassis in the same fashion as clients among passive elements.
B. Failure Impact Results
In this analysis, only the dominant failure modes (the ones
that accumulate the major part of the probability mass) are
included. This is because the entire set of network failure
modes grows exponentially with the number of elements.
Considering failure modes with at most two failed elements is
enough to accurately capture the performance of the network,
and also keep a reasonable computational effort.
Fig. 5 presents the probability that the number of clients
affected in a failure mode is equal or bigger than a given
percentage of the total number of clients, for the different
schemes. A value of 10 is chosen for both n and N . Two
values are chosen for the distance between clients, l. Solid
lines depict the baseline value in Sect. II-B.3. The other value
(dashed lines) is selected so that the furthest clients are located
at 20 km from the CO (maximum reach for TDM PONs [15]).
This value is obtained by making the maximum distance in (7)
equal to 20 km. Then, scenarios with a dense (smaller l) or
sparse (bigger l) concentration of clients are modeled.
From Fig. 5, it is easy to see that schemes a), c), d) and e)
perform very similar regarding failure impact. In fact, lines
corresponding to schemes a), c) and d) are hidden behind
the green line (scheme e)). The probability of affecting more
than 17% of the clients is quite low, as all lines present a
gap around this value. In [7], where the unprotected case
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Fig. 5. Probability that the number of clients affected by a failure is equal or
bigger than a certain % of the total number of clients for different schemes.
n = 10; N = 10.
was analyzed, this gap was present around 50%. This reveals
that protection of the feeder fibers is of uttermost importance,
reducing considerably the failure impact. Failures affecting
more than 17% of the clients are related with two failed OLT
chassis or two failures in the vertical feeder trench. In [6], the
importance of protection the OLT is also examined. Scheme b)
is revealed as the worst option, due to larger protection paths.
Hence, laying all the protection fibers in the same trench is
actually better, as long as they are physically disjoint from the
working fibers. Schemes c) and e) are slightly better than the
others for small percentages. However, providers are interested
in reducing the probability of large outages, thus protection of
distribution fibers is not significant as few clients are affected.
The probability of large outages is larger in sparse scenarios
(bigger l), as trenches are longer, and the differences between
schemes are more noticeable.
Fig. 6 shows how scheme c) is influenced by the network
layout. All the schemes perform in a similar way, so the results
in Fig. 6 are analogous for all of them.
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Fig. 6. Probability that the number of clients affected by a failure is equal
or bigger than a certain % of the total number of clients for different network
layouts. Scheme c)
Different planning decisions are captured by varying n
and N . Increasing n while decreasing N implies bigger
distribution areas, but the number of these areas is smaller.
The opposite leads to more, though small, distribution areas.
Parameter l varies as explained before. In general, protection
of the feeder fibers reduces the effect of the physical lay-
out on the failure impact. Instead, it is heavily influenced
by the physical granularity of the chassis, mainly by the
arrangement of OLT port and chassis. This arrangement makes
the gap between the most and least probable outages occur
at different percentages. E.g. the probability of two OLT
chassis failing at the same time is around 10 8, but the
number of clients affected varies considerably depending on
the previous arrangement. Yet, the physical layout still has
an effect on the failure impact (especially for large outages).
Bigger distribution areas (larger n), for the same subscriber
density (same l) lead to a larger probability of large outages
(around one order of magnitude). Also, sparse concentration
of clients (larger l) has approximately the same effect.
V. AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, an availability analysis based on the ge-
ometric model is carried out. The novelty of this analysis
lies in including a general physical layout of the deployment
area, so that how different planning decisions affect the user
availability is investigated. Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs)
have been employed for the availability analysis, where the
availability values have been taken from [12] and [3]. The
availability of feeder and distribution fibers depends on their
lengths, calculated from (7) and explanations in Sect. III-B.
Fig. 7 shows the percentage of clients that could be offered
a given availability, for the different schemes and values of
l (n = N = 10). The availability not only depends on the
protection scheme, but also on the client-CO distance. The
highest availability (achieved by a very low percentage of
clients) corresponds to the availability that can be offered
to the closest clients to the CO. The lowest availability
corresponds to the availability achieved by the furthest clients
(thus, it can be offered to 100% of the clients). An example
is given in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7. Availability achieved by different % of clients for n = 10; N = 10.
It is clear, from Fig. 7, that protection at the distribution
level does become relevant when dealing with availability.
Schemes d) and e), where fibers are fully protected, perform
similarly, with the lines for scheme d) hidden by the lines
for scheme e). These schemes are much better than the others
(with e) being the best) and achieve almost the same avail-
ability in sparse or dense scenarios. Schemes a) and b) also
perform in the same way, the lines for scheme a) hidden behind
the lines for scheme b). They do not have protection at the
distribution level. Still, for dense scenarios, the availability is
kept above 0.99994, enough for most of the clients. Hence, the
additional protection does not represent a huge improvement
in dense scenarios. Yet, in sparse scenarios, only 65% of the
clients can be offered an availability of at least 0.9999 in
schemes a) and b). This calls for differentiated dependability
in sparse scenarios, not only in the traditional sense of business
and residential users, but also based on the client-CO distance.
Close located clients achieve an acceptable availability without
distribution fibers protection, while faraway clients require it.
Scheme c) is a special case that illustrates the importance
of flexibility at the RN. A failure in a vertical distribution
trench may produce a failure in working distribution fibers and
protection feeder fibers (Fig 4 a) and b)). Although scheme
c) may seem more reliable than schemes d) and e) (as it
duplicates the passive element at the RN), it cannot switch
from working and distribution paths at the RN, leading to
a drop in availability. From the RBD point of view, vertical
distribution trenches become a single point of failure for
scheme c), while a bridge structure in schemes d) and e). Then,
scheme c) becomes inappropriate when trenches are reused,
which is a common practice to reduce costs.
Fig. 8 shows how the availability of scheme a) is affected by
the network layout. Scheme b) behaves exactly the same, while
schemes d) and e) (fully protected) are almost not influenced
by the network layout, thus uninteresting. Scheme c) is of no
interest also as it is not appropriate for protection.
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Fig. 8. Availability achieved by different % of clients in distinct network
layouts. Scheme a)
Parameters n, N and l vary in the same way as in the
previous section. As scheme a) do not provide protection at the
distribution level, Fig. 8 shows how the availability (in contrast
to the failure impact) is burdened by the distribution fibers. The
general trend is that designs with larger distribution areas offer
a worse availability. Also, the bigger the distribution area, the
larger the drop in availability. This is not a case of concern
in dense scenarios (solid lines), as the availability is above
0.9999 in all the cases. However, the network layout does plays
a major role in sparse scenarios. Sparse scenarios with small
distribution areas (n = 6) perform well (from the availability
point of view) even without protection at the distribution level.
Yet, for sparse scenarios with very large distribution areas
(n = 18), the offered availability falls more than one order
of magnitude. Nonetheless, big distribution areas reduce the
CAPEX of the network, as is explained in Sect. VI. In fact,
node consolidation (covering larger areas by the CO and RN)
is an on-going trend among operators to reduce costs.
This reveals a trade-off between failure impact, availability
and CAPEX, that may be solved by differentiated dependabil-
ity based on the clients-CO distance. Large distribution areas
may be employed for reducing costs, where some of them
may be left unprotected (the closest to the CO). Still, faraway
located distribution areas should be provided with protection
at the distribution level. However, not very large distribution
areas can be designed (e.g. n = 18) because, as pointed out
in Sect. IV, the probability of large outages is one order of
magnitude larger than in designs with small distribution areas.
VI. CAPEX ANALYSIS
In this section, the CAPEX associated with the different
protection schemes is calculated. Also, how the physical
network layout influences the CAPEX is highlighted.
For the CAPEX calculation, it is assumed that all the clients
covered by the network subscribe to the service (i.e. a take
rate of 100% is assumed). The cost of each element has been
taken from [3]. The number of the working components and
the working trenching length is computed with the expressions
in Sect. II-B. The working fiber length can be calculated with
Eq. (5) and (6), the latter multiplied by dn2=splitting ratioe
as described in Sect. II-B.2. The number of the protection
components, the protection trench length and the protection
fiber length are computed with the explanations in Sect. III.
In Fig. 9, the CAPEX per subscriber (in $) is shown, for
the different schemes with different network layouts in dense
scenarios (l is equal to the baseline value). Exact values for the
case n = 10; N = 10 are given in Table I for easy comparison
(it follows the same trend for other network layouts).
Fig. 9. Cost per subscriber for different physical layouts in dense scenarios.
In dense scenarios (see Fig. 9 and Table I), for a given
network layout, there are no big differences between the pro-
tection schemes at the same level (feeder or distribution). Also,
TABLE I
CAPEX PER CLIENT (IN $) FOR THE DIFFERENT SCHEMES WITH
n = 10; N = 10.
Scheme l = 1=24 l = 20=99
Unprotected [7] 1 030 2 432
a) 1 051 2 524
b) 1 054 2 517
c) 1 405 4 043
d) 1 446 4 059
e) 1 405 4 043
compared to the CAPEX of an unprotected PON discussed
in [7], the cost of protection at the feeder level is quite
inexpensive. Yet, the CAPEX increases as more protection
is added, but the difference is affordable in dense scenarios.
This is because the working trenching and CO-related costs,
that are the main contribution to the CAPEX, are the same
in all the cases. Hence, the reutilization of fibers (schemes b)
and d)) does not provide additional savings. In fact, schemes
reutilizing fibers, i.e. b) with respect to a) and d) with respect
to c) and e), are more expensive in dense scenarios due to
the additional components needed to reutilize fibers. Then,
although protection at the distribution level is affordable, it is
not needed unless very large distribution areas are designed
or a very high availability is required (the probability of large
outages is not affected by protection at the distribution level).
As for the network layout, Fig. 9 reveals two main effects.
The first effect is the arrangement of OLT ports and chassis,
as the CO-related costs are predominant. Layouts n = 8; N =
12 and n = 12; N = 8 present fully loaded OLT ports
and fewer chassis, leading to smaller CAPEX. If the OLT
ports and chassis arrangement is the same, as in the other
three layouts, the second effect is the size of the distribution
areas. CAPEX per client increases with smaller distribution
areas. Small distribution areas entail a large number of them,
increasing the number of feeder trenches and fibers and the
associated CAPEX. Yet, small distribution areas lead to a
larger availability and to a decrease in the probability of large
outages. Thus, there is a trade-off between availability/failure
impact and CAPEX when designing the access network.
Fig. 10 depicts the CAPEX (in $) per client for different
schemes and network layouts in sparse scenarios. Also, Table
I show the values for the case n = 10; N = 10.
First, it is obvious that the CAPEX increases considerably
compared to dense scenarios, due to larger distances implying
larger trenches and fibers. As in dense scenarios, the variations
in the CAPEX for the different schemes (at the same level)
in a given network layout are quite small. The inclusion of
protection at the feeder level is also inexpensive in sparse
scenarios if trenches are reused. However, this is not true
for protection at the distribution level. In contrast to the
dense case, reutilization of fibers entails savings at the feeder
level (scheme b) is cheaper than scheme a)) but not at the
distribution level (scheme d) is the most expensive).
The impact of the network layout in the CAPEX for sparse
scenarios is only dominated by the trench and fiber costs.
Fig. 10. Cost per subscriber for different physical layouts in sparse scenarios.
When protection is present only at the feeder level, the feeder
trenches and fibers dominate the CAPEX. Thus large distri-
bution areas reduce the CAPEX, but burdens both the failure
impact and the availability. When protection is present at both
levels, the distribution trenches and fibers dominate, reversing
the trend. Now larger distribution areas lead lo higher CAPEX.
Although at maximum reach the layout n = 18; N = 6 does
not present the highest CAPEX, it would become the most
expensive for larger values of l. Then, with protection at both
levels in sparse scenarios, there is no dependability-CAPEX
trade-off with respect to the network layout.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the failure impact, availability and CAPEX of
different PON protection architectures have been evaluated.
In the evaluation, the network physical layout, infrastructure
sharing and design decisions have been taken into account by
means of a network geometric model. It has been shown that
protection at the feeder levels is almost compulsory in order to
reduce the probability of large outages, while protection at the
distribution level has little effect on it. Besides, feeder fiber
protection achieves acceptable availability values for areas
with a high density of clients. The availability provided by this
protection is also enough for clients located close to the CO in
areas with low density of clients. Protection at the feeder level
has been proven to be quite inexpensive, due to reutilization of
common trenches. Yet, this trench reutilization requires some
flexibility in the protection mechanisms in order not to hinder
the availability. Although clients situated far away from the
CO in sparse areas require protection at the distribution level,
this protection leads to large CAPEX. It may be effective
if business clients are present and/or if only a subset of the
distribution areas is protected. Also, schemes reutilizing fibers
are not well suited for providing protection. At the feeder
level, they lead to the worst failure impact results, and at the
distribution level imply the highest CAPEX.
Design decisions regarding the network layout have been
found to affect both the performance of protection schemes
and the CAPEX. In dense scenarios, fully loading the OLT
ports and chassis reduces the CAPEX but hinders the depend-
ability. The same is true when designing the PON with large
distribution areas, which is an on-going trend nowadays. This
also applies in sparse scenarios with feeder level protection,
as the CO-related costs do not dominate the CAPEX. Hence,
there is a direct trade-off between failure impact, availability
and CAPEX regarding the size of the distribution areas. The
negative impact of this practice in the availability can be
overcome by deploying protection at the distribution level.
Then, the CAPEX will be higher and the CAPEX trend with
respect to the distribution level size is inverted. However,
protection of the distribution fibers do not provide any benefits
regarding failure impact. Thus, both the availability-CAPEX
and failure impact-CAPEX trade-offs are still open.
The two trade-offs identified in this work call for further re-
search. The availability-CAPEX trade-off can be influenced by
other aspects such as migration towards next-generation PONs.
Also, the achieved availability may still not be acceptable for
business users. The failure impact-CAPEX trade-off plays a
major role when deciding the size of the distribution part. This
trade-off must be further analyzed taking into account also
loss due to penalties and loss of operator reputation. Finally,
the analyses presented here should be extended to other PON
architectures, with more accurate network models.
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